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THE PROGRESS OF PASSION
Kathryn Abrams*
THE PASSIONS OF LAW. Edited by Susan A. Bandes. New York: New
York University Press. 1999. Pp. xv, 367. Cloth, $45; paper, $22.50.
Like an abandoned fortress, the dichotomy between reason and
the passions casts a long shadow over the domain of legal thought. Be
set by forces from legal realism to feminist epistemology, this dichot
omy no longer holds sovereign sway. Yet its structure helps to articu
late the boundaries of the legal field; efforts to move in and around it
infuse present thinking with the echoes of a conceptually distinct past.
Early critics of the dichotomy may unwittingly have prolonged its in
fluence through the frontal character of their attacks. By challenging a
strong distinction between emotion and reason, critics kept it, para
doxically, before legal audiences. Moreover, within the context of this
approach, refusing the challenge posed by critics remained an intelli
gible response. Glimpsing, perhaps, the limits of this approach, an
emerging generation of critics has embraced a new strategy. By as
suming the interpenetration of reason and emotion in law, and turning
a keen, evaluative eye to their complex relations, these scholars have
introduced new lines of inquiry. They have also often disarmed their
opponents: when one is assessing the competing claims of disgust and
indignation to direct the criminal law,1 for example, it becomes more
difficult for audiences to assert that emotions have no role in these le
gal processes.
Susan Bandes's2 collection, The Passions of Law, is a triumphant
example of this new genre of critique. "Emotion," Bandes declares in
opening the book, "pervades the law" (p. 1) - her collection takes its
shape from this transformative assumption. The question raised by the
thirteen provocative essays that comprise this volume is almost never,
"Can emotion co-exist with the demands of reason in law?" It is, as we
learn in Bandes's illuminating introduction, "which emotions deserve
the most weight in legal decision making, and which emotions belong
in which legal contexts?" (p. 7)· It is how to assess the varying func
tions that law can perform in relation to the emotions - whether ex* Herma Hill Kay Distinguished Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley
School of Law (Boalt Hall); Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. B.A. 1980, Harvard
Radcliffe; J.D. 1984, Yale. - Ed.

1. See Martha Nussbaum, Secret Sewers of Vice: Disgust, Bodies and the Law, p. 19.

2. Professor of Law, DePaul University.
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pressing, identifying, channeling, elevating, or satisfying individual or
collective passions. It is how both law and the emotions that inflect it
are shaped by elements of the broader culture in which both subsist.
The great contribution of this volume is to shift the debate away from
familiar dichotomies and toward the vast terrain that can be recon
structed by exploring the pervasive influences of the emotions in law.
The gaps and inchoate elements in the collection remind us of just
how large a task this may prove to be.
I.

THE PASSIONS OF LAW

The Passions of Law is presented in four parts: this framework
nominally takes its bearings from the character of the passion to be
explored, but other organizing principles come rapidly into view. The
first section, "Disgust and Shame," features essays by Martha
Nussbaum, Dan Kahan, and Toni Massaro debating the role of dis
gust, and secondarily shame, in the criminal law. The anchor for this
debate is Kahan's brief yet pointed essay, "The Progressive Appro
priation of Disgust," in which Kahan continues a sustained scholarly
effort to use the force of shared (community) norms to enhance com
pliance with the criminal law. While Kahan's earlier works focused on
the ways that law could enlist the emotion of shame in inducing com
pliance,3 this essay turns its attention to disgust: an expression of col
lective disapproval that might animate the criminal law, and one of the
emotions of judgment capable of eliciting shame. Kahan argues that
the hierarchical judgments entailed by legal expressions of disgust are
not only appropriate condemnations for certain kinds of offenders, but
should be appealing to progressives who often resist their inegalitarian
character. The kind of comparative judgment reflected in a public ex
pression of disgust is not only inevitable but also valuable: it repre
sents a potent species of expressive capital that should not be ceded to
offenders alone. Moreover, competing public expressions of disgust
provide occasions for glimpsing and comparing important hierarchies
of value.
Nussbaum contests this conclusion by reconstructing disgust. She
describes it not as expressing a hierarchy of value, but as reflecting
human discomfort with our ineliminable animality, which we seek un
easily to escape by projecting it onto a specific person or group. This
projection of animality onto a particular group has often been the
predicate for cruel and dehumanizing treatment, in examples from
Nazi Germany to the trial of Oscar Wilde. The viscerality of disgust
also renders it publicly inarticulate, which causes it to compare poorly
to the competing emotion of indignation. Indignation, which reflects
3. See, e.g. , Dan Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591
(1996).
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the anger triggered by unfitting treatment, can animate statements of
public reason, making it a more suitable emotion for directing criminal
legal enforcement.
Massaro, in a far-ranging essay, looks both at the public imposition
of shame and at the evaluative emotions, such as disgust, that might
animate it. Debates within both emotion theory and the norm theory
on which Kahan draws, Massaro claims, raise questions about the use
of law to induce shame in broad categories of offenders. Evidence of a
broad-based human concern with status, for example, says little about
whether the government might deploy that concern, through the im
position of shaming penalties, to induce compliance with law.
Scholarship about the emotions suggests that there is too much uncer
tainty about how they are triggered, and in what combinations, and
with what variation across different populations, to support the kind of
simplified incentivizing system that Kahan advocates. Massaro also
highlights tendencies that could be introduced into criminal justice, if
the law were understood as a means of expressing disgust at offenders.
Expressions of disgust entail no metric that could assess or limit the
extent of punishment, making cruel or disproportionate punishments
an ominous possibility. Such expressions might also be rendered banal
when articulated in more widespread or ritualized form.
Part II focuses on "Remorse and the Desire for Revenge." The
first of these emotions is explored by Austin Sarat, whose nuanced ex
amination of Tim Robbins's film Dead Man Walking probes our soci
ety's ambivalence about the degree to which we can either demand or
recognize genuine remorse in the criminal offender.
The "desire for revenge" is explored in essays by Robert Solomon,
Jeffrie Murphy, and Danielle Allen that examine three different vari
ants of this emotion. Solomon's essay invites us to consider how the
often-maligned emotion of vengeance might be embodied in the law.
He defends a conception of vengeance as an intense yet "cool" emo
tion with an element of instrumental rationality that points toward
talionic notions of suitability or proportionality. This view permits him
to argue that vengeance might not only be expressed, but channeled,
elevated, and satisfied through its incorporation in the law. Indeed, the
dominant metaphors we use even now to talk about vengeance metaphors of debt, balance, or pollution - suggest limiting notions
that might make vengeance through law containable and might foster
a sense of relationship among victims, offenders, and the (legal) aven
ger.
Murphy, writing about retribution, reconsiders his longstanding
support for a retributive theory of punishment. Building on arguments
offered by Nietzsche, he questions whether either of the emotions os
tensibly underlying the retributive urge, guilt or ressentiment, is epis
temically reliable enough to provide the impetus for retributive action.
More generally, he calls into question the goal of character retribution
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- that the state should mete out punishments that respond not simply
to the acts but to the "inner wickedness" of the offender. Using in
sights from Kant and Jesus Christ, he argues that we are neither so
perspicacious in assessing the character of the offender, nor so free
from our own failings, that we should depart as starkly as this strategy
requires from a posture of moral humility.
The final essay, by Danielle Allen, is concerned with anger. Allen
examines the use of retribution in ancient Athens to reflect on our
contemporary discomfort with retributive justifications for punish
ment. In Athens, both the public and lawmakers recognized that
"wrongdoing and punishment had to do with relations between peo
ple" (p. 193). Retributive sanctions thus responded to anger in the
community, to an imbalance that had been created through the
wrongdoer's act. It was only, after Plato, when punishment came to re
flect a defect in the offender - the "disease" to be cured was baseness
in the offender rather than anger in the community - that retributive
action took on the problematic character it retains to this day.
Part III of the book treats the most eclectic and far-reaching group
of emotions. Cheshire Calhoun explains how laws and legal rhetoric
restricting the institution of marriage to "one man and one woman"
(p. 237) are based not only on an emotion, but on a socially
constructed emotion: a carefully-scripted notion of romantic love that
"exceptionlessly cast[s] heterosexuals in the leading roles" (p. 222).
Noting that emotions are often constructed to reinforce social hierar
chies, Calhoun argues that denying certain groups the capacity to ex
perience can be a means of subordination. Particular emotions may be
"outlaw[ed]" because they presuppose, as philosophers Allison Jaggar
and Elizabeth Spelman have argued,4 "the beginning of a critical social
theory."5 The argument that gays and lesbians lack the capacity to ex
perience romantic love - a proposition fostered not only by cultural
imagery but by the psychoanalytic communities of the 1950s and 60s
- thus perpetuates sexual hierarchy. It should be resisted by decon
structing the cultural knowledge on which it rests.
William Miller is concerned with fear and cowardice, as reflected
in the Code of Military Justice regarding "misbehavior before the en
emy."6 Leading the reader on a legal, historical and literary tour of
such failings as "running away" (p. 243), "gentle offense versus craven
defense" (p. 246), and "throwing away one's weapons" (p. 250), Miller
explores the subtle distinctions among different species of fear and
4. P. 223-24 (discussing Elizabeth V. Spelman, Anger and Insubordination, and Alison
Jaggar, Love and Knowledge: Emotion in Feminist Epistemology, in WOMEN, KNOWLEDGE,
AND REALITY (Ann Garry & Marilyn Pearsall eds., 1989)).
5. P. 223 (quoting Alison Jaggar, Love and Knowledge: Emotion in Feminist Epistemol
ogy, in WOMEN, KNOWLEDGE, AND REALITY (Ann Garry & Marilyn Pearsall eds., 1989)).
6. P. 241 (quoting 10 U.S.C.S. § 899 (Law. Co-op. 1997)).
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cowardice. He also reflects on the difficulties of inferring these emo
tional states from the actions of the accused.
In the final essay of this part, Martha Minow asks how legal institu
tions can address the emotions aroused by mass violence committed
under governmental auspices. She surveys innovations such as the
United Nations International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa to suggest
the role that law can play, not only in gathering facts often shrouded in
secrecy, but in "reconnect[ing] individuals with a . . . community com
mitted to establish[ing] and protect[ing] human rights" (p. 269) and
providing at least some of them "a way past revenge" (p. 267). Look
ing both at the asserted benefits of such institutions and at their poten
tial shortfalls, Minow then contrasts them with efforts to attend to the
emotional states of participants in more familiar forms of dispute
resolutions, such as ADR.7
The final portion of the book, "Passion for Justice," explores the
role of passion in the tasks of making or obeying the law. Part IV
opens with an essay by John Deigh that describes obedience to the law
as being fueled by an emotional bond between the citizen and those
who govern him that is akin to - as well as modeled and fostered by
- the bond linking children and their parents.
Following this essay, Richard Posner and Samuel Pillsbury take on
what is perhaps the most familiar question in the study of law and the
emotions: the role of emotion in the life and work of the judge. In
Posner's essay, the question of judicial emotion is one of several,
which include the role of hatred and shaming in administration of the
criminal law and the role of evidence in providing a filter that seeks to
insure the proper emotional state in the judge. But what does Posner
have to say about this state? Posner emphasizes the role of emotions
in difficult cases that "cannot be resolved by a purely algorithmic pro
cedure but require[] recourse to intuition, moral feelings, the balanc
ing of opposed interest, and political preferences" (p. 321). However,
reasserting the traditional dichotomy, he notes that the emotions may
be out of place in run-of-the-mill adjudication where "they would in
terfere with the problem-solving process" (p. 321); and even in the
7. Though their emotional foci are distinct, these essays share many central themes with
those of Part II. As distinct from Part I, they are concerned with the many varied ways in
which law can engage the emotions: what we see in essays by Solomon, Allen, Minow and
Calhoun is not simply the expression of emotion through law, but the structuring or eleva
tion of emotion, the satisfaction of emotion, and the deployment of emotional scripts to per
petuate hierarchy. These essays are also alert to the shaping of both law and emotion by the
elements of the surrounding culture. Calhoun shares this interest in cultural formation with
Allen and Sarat. The essays of Parts II and III are also concerned with the epistemic difficul
ties of identifying emotional states with enough certainty to make them the predicate for
legal consequences: here Sarat's ambivalence about demanding remorse tracks Miller's un
certainty about fear. Murphy's epistemic doubts about glimpsing "wickedness" in the soul of
the offender offer a similar - though less directly emotive - theme.
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more complex cases, emotions can create a danger because "the resis
tance put up by 'objective' . . . considerations will be weaker" (p. 321).
One key for judges may lie in identifying the emotions most appropri
ate to judging, or, as Posner intermittently puts it, distinguishing be
tween "emotion" and "emotionalism" (p. 310). The first emotion that
is particularly appropriate to the judge's task is indignation, which is
both "the normal reaction to a violation of the moral code of one's so
ciety" (p. 322) and "the mode by which a violation is identified"
(p. 322). The second is empathy, which Posner defines in a characteris
tically iconoclastic way. The point of judicial empathy is not to make
immediate to the judge the plight of those before the court, but rather
"to bring home to the judge the interests of absent parties" (p. 323), or
to combat "the availability heuristic": that is, "the tendency to give too
much weight to vivid immediate impressions . . . and hence to pay . . .
too little [attention] to absent persons likely to be affected by the deci
sion" (p. 323).
Pillsbury, in contrast, argues that the emotions capable of shaping
judging in salutary ways may be different for different judges. Forging
a genre of inquiry he refers to as "emotive analysis" (p. 331), which
combines elements of judicial biography with a search for the influ
ence of emotions on appellate opinion-writing, Pillsbury examines the
role of emotions in the work of Justices John Harlan and Oliver
Wendell Holmes. Though Harlan appeared to be animated by outrage
at group-based injustice and Holmes by a thirst for timeless intellec
tual achievement, both forms of "passion for justice" (p. 349) may
have fueled the unique line of vision achieved by each in his landmark
dissents.
II. CHARTING PASSION'S PROGRESS
. It is one of the great virtues of this volume that virtually every es
say opens up new lines of argument, incites fruitful differences of
opinion, or otherwise merits extensive commentary. The limited space
of a review essay thus forces painful choices on one who would assess
this provident and lively collection. Instead of touching on each essay
briefly, or focusing at length on a subset of essays, I will take another
strategy, one specifically tailored to Bandes's ambitious goals in as
sembling the volume. In the discussion that follows, I will consider The
Passions of Law less as a collection of individual essays than as an ef
fort to instigate a new generation of questions about the relation be
tween emotions and the law. I will look at the patterns and relations
among the essays as a way of identifying what questions are being
raised, and how they are being handled; what issues are being elided
or moved to the margins; and what kinds of inquiries might fruitfully
be undertaken to supplement the effort reflected here. In so doing, I
will respond to individual essays, though perhaps differently, and cer-
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tainly at less length, than would be the case with a different evaluative
approach. I will organize my analysis around three kinds of questions
that appear to be raised most directly by the structure and content of
the collection:8 what is the range of possible relations between the
emotions and the law; which emotions should influence or should be
enacted through the law and in what contexts; and whose (that is,
which actors') emotions are the proper object of attention by legal
analysts. In concluding, I will also touch on a fourth question, namely,
how might analysis of the "passions of law" affect the sensibilities of
those undertaking the inquiry.
A. Relations Among Law and the Emotions
In first-generation analyses of law and the emotions, the engage
ments or interrelations that were acknowledged between the two were
confined to certain well-rehearsed patterns. In the many areas of law
in which emotion was regarded as problematic or at least controversial
- the act of judging is the most familiar example - emotion was
characterized as alien, and perhaps threatening, to the processes of
more detached reason that characterized the activity. Revisionary ac
counts sought to characterize emotion as adding something distinct
and valuable to that process;9 yet the relation remained more or less
oppositional. Moreover, to the extent that engagement produced any
change in the character of the contending forces, it was emotion that
modified the character of law - conceived in this case as abstract
8. Although my approach is, I believe, suited to Bandes's aspirations in assembling this
collection, the categories of questions I identify here do not faithfully track those framed by
Bandes in her excellent introduction. This partial divergence may be attributable to the fact
that we are most strongly engaged by different questions, or that we frame those questions at
different levels of abstraction. Bandes, for example, identifies virtually all the relations
among law and the emotions that I discuss below, but does not focus on their (unusual)
range or make the kinds of comparisons among them that I undertake here. However, I sus
pect that the main reason for divergence is the difference in our tasks and the orientations
they produce. Because Bandes's goal is to incite an expansion in our thinking about law and
the emotions, her conceptualization is provocative and allusive. She identifies a far greater
number of organizing inquiries and seeks to destabilize the substantive contribution of each
essay by reading it first as oriented toward one set of questions and later as engaging an
other. Facing this proliferation of issues and aiming toward evaluation, as well as introduc
tion, my analysis focuses on those patterns reflecting broadest or strongest coherence within
the work as a whole and imposes greater fixity on the meaning or contribution of particular
essays.
9. See, e.g., Martha L. Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, Passion for Justice, 10 CARDOZO
L. REV. 37 (1988); Judith Resnik, On the Bias: Feminist Reconsideration of the Aspirations
for our Judges, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1877 (1988). In noting the limits of these analyses, I do
not intend a backhanded critique - these were provocative interventions at that stage of the
inquiry (indeed, at that point, one might more appropriately have called it a debate). It is
simply that the conversation these first interventions initiated has progressed. One might
take as indicative the fact that Martha Minow, one of the leading contributors to the early
stages of this debate in law, has conceptualized the relations between law and the emotions
in a distinct and more complex way in this volume.
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reason - rather than the other way around. In those few areas - such
as the criminal law - in which emotion was viewed less as an unwel
come intruder than as an organic part of the legal process, relations
tended to be unidirectional and expressive; emotions explained or
animated the structure of the law. The criminal law was understood as
giving voice, for example, to our retributive urges in the face of
wrongdoing.
One of the great surprises - and great pleasures - of The
Passions o f Law is the rich range of relations it conceives between the
emotions and the law. The early relations are amply and interestingly
represented. Posner's essay evokes the traditional tension between
reason and the emotions, yet with the acknowledgement that the en
richment of the former by the latter is possible, and with the additional
hybridity implicit in judges' efforts to confront the "availability heuris
tic" (p. 323). Kahan's and Nussbaum's essays reflect criminal scholars'
interest in the expressive functions of the law, yet extend this interest
by exploring the animating emotions of disgust and indignation.
Massaro branches out from these traditional concerns by writing, criti
cally, about the role of law in evoking certain responses in offenders.
And Sarat and Miller explore, with mixed fascination and ambiva
lence, the conditioning of legal outcomes on decision makers' abilities
to identify certain emotions, such as fear or remorse, in those who
stand accused by the legal system.
Perhaps most novel and evocative, however, are a group of essays
that envision a more complete interpenetration of law and particular
emotions, and focus, in particular, on the way that law may shape or
construct the emotions. Robert Solomon's essay on vengeance and the
criminal law, Danielle Allen's analysis of approaches to collective an
ger at wrongdoing in ancient Athens, and Martha Minow's exploration
of procedures for addressing emotions aroused by mass violence are
particularly illuminating in this regard. None of these essays regards
the expressive function as fully capturing law's relation to emotion, al
though each acknowledges this role. These essays are more concerned
with the ways in which law can act on - perhaps one could say shape
or construct - the emotions of individuals or communities. Solomon
is concerned with the potential of law to "rationalize and satisfy"
(p. 131) the constellation of collective emotions we identify with the
desire for vengeance in the face of wrongdoing. Allen similarly takes
up the theme of "satisfying" emotion - with an emphasis perhaps less
on refinement than on catharsis - when she writes about addressing
the collective "dis-ease" of anger in ancient Athens. Minow's empha
sis is on the law's engagement with individual emotions - in this case,
the emotions of the victims of mass, state-sponsored violence. She fo
cuses on the ways that legal investigation, publicity, and affirmation,
both of one's experience of violence and of countervailing human
rights norms, can make it possible to move beyond a desire for venge-
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ance, or to replace that urge with a less consuming desire to hold
wrongdoers responsible, so that one can get on with one's life. Minow
memorably quotes Jadranka Cigelj, a Muslim victim of Serbian rape,
torture and detention, who collected testimony from other survivors
and pursued prosecutions in the UN International Tribunal for the
former
Yugoslavia:
When you think of a 15-year-old girl whose entire world was de
stroyed . . . how her youth was stolen and how she was turned into a
wounded animal, you realize that what is important is to work toward a
way to hold these people responsible and punish them. Then one day you
wake up and the hatred has left you, and you feel r�lieved because ha
tred is exhausting, and you say to yourself, "I am not like them. " (p. 267)
For Cigelj, the law, acting on a character of remarkable resiliency, has
helped transform overwhelming hatred into a more bounded desire
for accountability and justice that permits the resumption of the more
familiar aspects of her life.
One factor that has made possible this view of the emotions as
constructed by and through law is a set of new understandings of the
emotions themselves. Both Minow and Massaro point to shifts in emo
tion theory that characterize emotions not as raw, unmediated affect,
but as having a cognitive structure or an evaluative component.
Cheshire Calhoun gives this insight a more explicitly political valence
when she talks about "outlaw emotions" (p. 223) as containing the
seeds of a social critique. For Solomon, perhaps most clearly, his care
ful reconstruction of the emotion of vengeance is closely connected to
its capacity to be elevated or satisfied by law. When he characterizes
vengeance not as a burst of anger but as a "cool" emotion with "its
kernel of rationality" (p. 127), he describes an emotion that is capable
of being purified or satisfied by law, often without resort to violence.
The rationality, and the conceptual limits implicit in vengeance highlighted by Solomon in his discussion of the three metaphors most
consistently associated with discourse about vengeance - are what
provide law its purchase when it begins to act on this passion.
This notion of the emotions as both cognitively inflected and
(therefore) malleable shapes a related, fascinating feature of this col
lection: its view of the emotions, and the law that acts on them, as
sculpted by the wider cultural context in which both exist. This view
comes across most clearly in Calhoun, who writes about emotions as
being "scripted" by cultural representations that are underwritten by
certain forms of knowledge; but one also finds it in Allen, who con
trasts the Athenian understanding of the collective "dis-ease" created
by wrongdoing, with the more contemporary cultural understanding
that locates the disease within the offender. Sarat envisions a more
mutually reinforcing relation between law and culture when he opines
that particular cultural representations, such as Dead Man Walking,
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may reflect our ambivalence about our emphasis on, and ability to as
sess, remorse.
If the intriguing variety of the relations envisioned between law
and the emotions is the great strength of this volume, one of its small
disappointments is its failure to spell out, at least in some cases, the
implications of these relations for specific legal interventions. Kahan's
discussion of disgust makes the closest approach to implementation,
although even here it is not clear whether he aims simply at enhanced
penalties for hate crimes, or favors some ritualized official expressions
of disgust. A more important question - whether he views the legal
system as a forum for airing competing conceptions of disgust or sys
tematically implementing one conception over another - also re
mains unresolved. Yet most American legal scholars, I would suspect,
have some feel for an expressive approach to law and the emotions; in
the criminal field, as I note above, it is not entirely new. The more
compelling questions concern those legal regimes that might effect the
construction or transformation of emotion. This conception seems less
familiar, and perhaps more daunting; I found myself reading breath
lessly to see how it might be accomplished. However, few of these
more inventive essays venture far into the realm of implementation.
Solomon stops with the introduction of a series of metaphors, by
which we might structure a legal approach to vengeance. Allen offers
a vivid portrait of the satisfaction of collective anger in Athens, but
neglects to tell us whether or how the temporal and cultural distance
might be bridged so as to make her example germane to contemporary
law and policymaking. Minow's essay goes the farthest in this regard,
interlacing explanations of various factfinding and reconciliation
commissions with narrative accounts of their emotive effects on survi
vors of mass violence. Yet her essay provides only a brief tour of these
innovations and quite intentionally raises as many questions as it an
swers.10 These questions of implementation are crucial, because they
touch on issues - raised both by Minow, and more extensively, by
Massaro - about the limits of our knowledge of the emotions and the
challenges of acting on a force as volatile and variable as emotion with
an instrumentality as crude as law. These reservations might seem to
apply with greatest force to Kahan's work on shame, because he proj
ects such confidence that one can use law to produce emotional states,
and because his efforts to incentivize compliance with criminal law
through the production of shame in offenders envision the most direct
or mechanical relation between law and emotion. Yet these questions
also apply to approaches that use law not to produce but to assuage,
satisfy, or transform emotion: these too may require an understanding
10. A more sustained treatment is provided in Minow's excellent book, BETWEEN
VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER MASS GENOCIDE AND
VIOLENCE (1998), from which her essay is taken.
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of the factors that influence the experience of emotion, or the role of
law in effecting changes in emotional states that exceed what we cur
rently have to offer.
B.

Varieties of Emotion

Which emotions are most appropriately reflected or embodied in
law, and in what contexts? In answering this central question, the vol
ume strives for both breadth and depth. The organization of the book
highlights the range of passions that may be brought to bear in the le
gal context. Part III is especially valuable in probing emotions, such as
love, fear, and forgiveness, whose life within the law has less fre
quently been explored. Part IV's discussion of judging contributes to
the elaboration of a cognitive strand in the emotions. Pillsbury argues
convincingly that the desire for transcendent intellectual achievement
- an interpersonally detached and cognitively oriented emotion played a pivotal role in the work of Oliver Wendell Holmes. And
Posner's description of judicial empathy as an effort to combat the
"availability heuristic" (p. 323) offers a potent, counter-intuitive chal
lenge to readers, although I remain undecided as to whether this ar
gument reflects a serious effort to reconstruct empathy, a partially
ironic project of colonizing discourse on the emotions with the analytic
frame of Chicago-style law and economics, or perhaps some combina
tion of the two.
The collection's effort to assess the contributions of different emo
tions to the work of the law is another of its strengths. The opening
trio of essays on shame and disgust are among the very best in the
book. Nussbaum's humane and learned essay argues convincingly that
the etiology of disgust in human discomfort with our irreducible ani
mality makes it an unreliable and dangerous basis for legal enact
ments; she also effectively highlights the greater proportionality and
articulacy of indignation. Massaro reminds us that the current state of
knowledge about the emotions raises serious questions about whether
they can be strategically evoked and deployed by law. This insight
sounds a cautionary note, not only in relation to Kahan, but in relation
to others of the authors who propose to shape emotion through law.
Perhaps the greatest frustration of this excellent section is that Kahan
has no opportunity to respond to these critiques. His essay is admira
bly focused and provocative, and he makes the interesting strategic
choice of pitching it to progressives, rather than to his more natural
intellectual allies on the right; yet he has almost no opportunity to ad
dress the dazzling range of reservations raised by Nussbaum and
Massaro. I would have liked to hear Kahan defend the clarity of dis
gust's public voice or explain whether and how shaming can be com
bined with the re-integration Massaro takes as crucial. It would have
been fascinating to hear him reflect on whether the subtle, variable,
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often elusive processes of emotional response can be harnessed by a
force as crude and inflexible as law. Critiques of this quality almost
demand a public response; providing one would have strengthened a
theory that aspires to broad influence and enriched what is already
one of the most thoughtful and provocative exchanges in the collec
tion. Part H's reconsideration of the desire for revenge also offers
powerful evaluative perspectives. Solomon's reconstruction of venge
ance is valuable not only for its identification of a cool, cognitive
strand in what is often conceived as fiery, impulsive emotion, but for
its introduction of a series of metaphors that draw out the sense of
proportionality implicit in the emotion and its potential to underscore
the ties of community among the offender, the accused, and the
agency of vengeance. And Murphy's essay on retribution is memora
ble for its vision of a major scholar explaining, with the care and hu
mility he advocates in approaches to punishment, why Nietsche, Kant,
and Jesus have led him to change his mind on retribution.
Yet notwithstanding these considerable virtues, there are ways in
which this feature of the collection falls short of its aims. Despite
Bandes's efforts to cull essays reflecting a range of emotions and con
texts, The Passions of Law retains a persistently criminal flavor. Of the
contributors to the book, only Calhoun and Deigh steer consistently
clear of criminal contexts; large segments of the book explore the mo
tives, effects, and meanings of punishment. There is also a striking, re
current emphasis on the reassessment - even the rehabilitation - of
dark, potentially hierarchical emotions such as vengeance, anger, ret
ribution, shame, and disgust. These features may be unsurprising,
given the longstanding primacy of the criminal law within analysis of
law and the emotions. They may also be fueled by movements within
the contributing disciplines themselves. Explaining his focus on venge
ance, Solomon notes:
[I]t seems to me that moral philosophy has for too long been suffocating
from a bad case of "political correctness." Self-righteousness and profes
sional peer pressure have converged to produce a literature that is utterly
unrealistic. Praise of virtue and gentility have become de rigueur. To
even consider the brutal opinions of hoi poloi is to place oneself out of
bounds. And so we dismiss as beneath contempt and unworthy of discus
sion those powerful negative feelings that in fact move most people and
help form their political views and opinions on social issues. (p. 125)
While Solomon may accurately describe the landscape within
moral philosophy, no such "political correctness" is choking off discus
sion of "powerful negative feelings" in law. On the contrary, Miller's
landmark treatment of disgust and contempt,11 and Kahan's writings
on shame and disgust12 have created a virtual cottage industry focused
1 1 . WILLIAM MILLER, THE ANATOMY OF DISGUST (1997).
12. Dan Kahan, The Anatomy of D isgust in Criminal Law, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1621
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on these harsh and hierarchical emotions. Perhaps academic lawyers,
unlike their philosophical colleagues, pride themselves on their ability
to look unflinchingly at the ugliest of human emotions and to redirect
them for social benefit.
In a collection in which such emotions are so thoughtfully chal
lenged and defended, however, the question is not why they occupy
the authors, but why they are not accompanied by essays probing
emotions of a different sort. The virtues may be overattended in moral
philosophy, but it is hard to argue that the same is true of law. And
some of these virtues involve emotional states that would make
promising objects of legal scholarly attention. What about courage?
Miller elaborately traces the ways that the military code identifies and
seeks to root out cowardice. But are there other means by which mili
tary regulations seek to foster courage? How does tort law bear on
what we see in others and expect of ourselves? What is the nature of
that courage that fuels a judicial departure from stare decisis? Or a
fiery or provocative dissent? Such inquiries may seem to press against
strongly engrained liberal instincts. To explore the relationship be
tween law and emotions connected with the virtues might seem to
breach the liberal requirement of government neutrality with respect
to competing visions of the good life. But while this argument may ex
plain an instinctive resistance to this kind of inquiry, it provides no
real justification. The government, as many legal scholars have
pointed out, contributes to the cultivation of what it believes to be vir
tues in a variety of direct and indirect ways: the tax code, the welfare
laws, and the regulation of sexuality are only a few of the most obvi
ous examples. The robust health of both libertarian and communi
tarian argument in law and public policy reflects this sometimes pre
carious balance, as well as the possibility of adjusting it in various ways
through public debate. Far from placing legal scholars in conflict with
the demands of a liberal conception of government, a careful mapping
of the relations between the law and "virtuous" emotional states could
ultimately strengthen it. It could help readers understand more pre
cisely how law fuels, fosters, prefers, incentivizes, or reflects ambiva
lence toward certain virtues in our present incarnation of liberal de
mocracy, and permit more informed debate over whether and how this
engagement should be changed.
One might also think about emotions that are not so easily situated
on the grid of vice and virtue. What about curiosity - surely as much
an emotion as the thirst for intellectual achievement? Or the complex
pleasure of what Vicki Schultz has called a "life's work"?13 Or, for that
matter, sexual desire? These emotions may not spring to mind as
readily as disgust, vengeance, or even courage; but they are passions
(1998); Kahan, supra note 3.
13. Vicki Schultz, Life's Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881 (2000).
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that, to take Solomon's terms, motivate many of us in our engage
ments with others and shape our political and social views. Why have
legal scholars neglected to consider how we serve these emotions
within the law? Some feminist legal scholars have recently argued that
one answer lies in the ways that legal scholars think about law. We en
vision law as having a set of more or less direct relations to those
states of affairs it seeks to bring about: it may enact certain institu
tional arrangements or prohibit certain behaviors;14 it may express cer
tain kinds of collective emotions. Not only laypersons but even legal
scholars tend to think far less about contexts in which the law plays a
more partial, facilitating role. Thus, the more indirect, supportive role
that law might play in relation to desire does not claim the attention of
legal thinkers, and desire itself falls off the legal radar screen.15 Yet
one of the great strengths of this collection is its ability to envision the
law in a range of different roles in relation to the outcomes with which
it is concerned, including emotional outcomes. This facilitative rela
tion, for example, forms a part of Minow's argument about healing the
wounds of mass genocide: the law cannot produce healing or demand
forgiveness; it can, however, help create preconditions which make the
experience of these emotions more likely.16 How this looser, more con
tingent understanding of legal effect might bear on emotions such as
sexual desire is one of the questions the authors of such a volume
would have been in a good position to answer.
C. Actors and Emotions
Whose emotions should be the objects of attention in legal analysis
of this genre? This is a question to which The Passions of Law gives
many answers. Kahan, Nussbaum, Solomon, and Murphy focus on the
emotions expressed by the government, as it speaks for the community
in the enforcement of criminal law. Allen addresses the emotions of
the community as distinct from the enactments of the government.
Deigh considers the emotions of the governed in their relation to the
14. See Kathryn Abrams, The Second Coming of Care, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1605, 1617
(2001) ("Law has too often been conceived as a means of prohibiting or bringing single
handedly into being particular arrangements or behaviors."); Katherine M. Franke, Theo
rizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and Desire, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 207-08 (2001)
("[H]ave [feminist legal theorists] . . . fallen victim to the myopia of which our discipline in
general suffers: thinking of rights and liberties primarily in negative . . . terms?").
15. Franke seems to offer a similar hypothesis in Theorizing Yes. Franke, supra note 14,
at 207-08.
16. See Abrams, supra note 14, at 1617 ("[L]aw can enable by removing constraints
and . . . by establishing material conditions, shaping expectations, or creating entitle
ments . . . . [I]t may be best [in certain contexts] . . . to view law simply as making possible (in
both senses of that word) certain practices, responses, or explorations."); Franke, supra note
14, at 208 ("[I]t may be that the best we can aspire to, as feminist legal theorists, is a set of
legal analyses, frames and supports that erect the enabling conditions for sexual pleasure.").
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government. Sarat, Miller, and Massaro focus on the emotions of the
accused. Minow is concerned with the emotions of victims, in this case
of mass governmental violence; and Calhoun is concerned with the
"outlaw emotions" (p. 223) of politically marginalized groups. Posner
and Pillsbury are concerned with the emotions of the judge. Yet not
withstanding this promising variety, there are subtle patterns in the ac
tors to whom the collection does and does not attend, that suggest the
need for additional kinds of inquiry.
The first pattern one observes is the predominance of the focus on
government. This may, in one sense, be unsurprising, as this collection
examines law and the emotions, and the government - in many spe
cific institutional guises - is responsible for promulgating, enforcing
and interpreting the law. But there are characteristics of the focus on
the governmental actor in these essays - many of which stem from
the criminal emphasis of the volume - that limit what we can learn
from their exploration of "governmental emotions." The first is an as
sumed continuity between the government and the "community" for
which it ostensibly speaks. The government, in Kahan or Solomon,
vindicates our disgust or desire for vengeance: it expresses or effectu
ates these emotions on behalf of a collectivity of citizens. This repre
sentative fiction elides many questions about what such representation
- particularly expressive emotional representation - means in the
context of a morally and politically plural society. This fiction is stan
dard, yet already strained, in the context of the criminal law: the do
main is sufficiently vexed that many groups feel the government does
not speak for them when it undertakes a certain prosecution or im
poses a certain penalty. Sarat alludes to this tension in his discussion of
Dead Man Walking, where the examination of remorse is played
against a broader backdrop of roiling social contention over the death
penalty. Yet this strain may become particularly acute when the gov
ernment expresses not a behavioral rule but a presumed emotional
state. What is the experience of, and the recourse available to, a citi
zen who does not seek vengeance, who feels indignation rather than
disgust, or who finds disgust antithetical to the aspirations of a demo
cratic society? Is it different from that of a death penalty abolitionist
who must endure the spectacle of executions imposed (ostensibly) on
his behalf? Is there something particularly acute about the words
placed in the mouth of the citizen by this representation when they are
not words, in fact, but feelings? These are interesting and difficult
questions, and they do not always get the attention they deserve in
these essays. Sarat, as noted above, points to the problem through the
implicit parallel of social ambivalence about remorse and ambivalence
about the death penalty. Nussbaum describes disgust as creating in
groups and out-groups, making inevitable the situation where the gov
ernment does not speak for large groups of those it ostensibly repre
sents. Kahan himself seems to suggest that the law might provide a
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public forum in which competing accounts of disgust can be advanced
and evaluated, though it is difficult to see how a dissenting citizen
would not feel eclipsed by the kind of publicly-articulated official ex
pressions of disgust that Kahan seems to favor. All of the essays con
cerned with governmental expression of emotion might benefit from a
more frontal consideration of these dilemmas, yet none takes it on di
rectly. Perhaps the closest attempt comes in an essay not primarily
concerned with the expressive conception: in exploring ancient
Athens, Allen evokes a time and place where the "community" on
whose behalf the criminal law was enforced was a less fictional entity
than is true today, and whose emotions and needs were prior to, and
could be discussed apart from, the specifics of governmental action.
Yet to glimpse this distinction in the context of ancient Athens is no
more than the first step toward saying what it would be to see and act
on it today.
The criminal backdrop of the book has a second major conse
quence: it means that most of the emotional contexts explored concern
interactions between the government, as enforcer of rules, and citizens
as accused of, or victimized by, violations. This triangulation of rela
tions, however, is not always paradigmatic. Many pervasive emotions
that law undertakes to address also arise in the relations between citi
zens, with the government entering in only later, in a ratifying or a re
medial posture. Relations of oppression or discrimination constitute
one potent example. The emotions associated with such relations are
not absent from this book. Nussbaum highlights a discriminatory dy
namic that is fueled or facilitated by disgust: projecting onto a stigma
tized group the features of animality one finds repugnant in oneself.
Calhoun identifies the way in which denying the validity, indeed the
possibility, of certain emotions within a stigmatized group denies that
group a resource from which it might build a social critique. Yet the
emphasis is on the emotional-related repertoire of the government as
a discriminating entity; this is only part of what we need to learn about
the emotional dynamics of discrimination. Discrimination can be
prompted by many different emotional states, particularly if emotion
is understood as having a cognitive thread: fear or anxiety about, or
disgust at, that which is "other"; callousness or insensitivity to certain
kinds of harm or pain; (unwarranted) confidence about the universal
izability of one's own experience. Taking the government as the para
digmatic discriminator will not reliably help us learn about the quality
of these emotion states, as governments do not themselves have emo
tions; they only imperfectly represent - or enact and ascribe - those
of their citizens. The focus on the government also diverts attention
from the experience of the victim. Victims again are not ignored in this
volume. The criminally accused are the focus of Sarat and Miller, al
beit in the context of assessing governmental factfinding about their
emotional states. And the victims of discrimination are considered by
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Nussbaum, Massaro, Calhoun, and Minow (the "mass violence" of
whose essay is frequently a matter of racial or ethnic antagonism). Yet
with the exception of Minow's essay, the emotional states of victimiza
tion are not explored in this collection. This is surprising, as this is not
untilled ground in law-related scholarship. The subjective experience
of both oppressor and target has been productively explored in femi
nist theory, critical race theory, and the emerging field of critical white
studies. It remains to be systematically related to the study of emo
tions, although the derogation of emotion stemming from the tradi
tional dichotomy has underwritten some of the criticism of this line of
work.17 This collection would have been a fine occasion for beginning
a dialogue between these complementary bodies of thought; that it
was not represents a lost opportunity.
Yet the practice of discrimination is not the only topic about which
readers might have learned from a greater focus on citizen-to-citizen
interactions. Probing the emotional states of market actors, and the
way that these states are shaped by instances of governmental inter
vention is another question that might have added range and variety
to the collection. Market actors have paradigmatically been charac
terized as subsisting entirely within the domain of rationality; the doc
trinal areas of contract or commercial transactions are frequently
taught and discussed as though they were insulated from the upheav
als of emotion that vex criminal or antidiscrimination law.18 This is
perhaps one place in which the traditional dichotomy continues to re
side: in the tendency to make emotion the distinctive province of par
ticular (potentially marginal) actors and domains, while preserving the
priority of reason in its pristine state in other more central legal
realms. Pressing these assumptions by exploring the sentiments of
greed, betrayal, generosity, and trust that seem as likely to infuse this
area as others seems a promising way of contesting this final refuge of
the dichotomy. Learning about the ways that contract or commercial
law intervene in these emotional states will also help us to understand
better these bodies of doctrine and the norms that they seek to vindi
cate. Such an exploration would have added range and provocation to
this volume, and might profitably be undertaken in the future.
Finally, as the government comes to represent the community or
the instrumentalities of discrimination in this volume, so too does the
17. For an account connecting the critique of experimental or narrative scholarship with
a defense of reason, see DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON:
THE RADICAL ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW (1997).
18. There are occasional, salutory exceptions to this general rule. The work of Peter
Huang and Lynn Stout, for example, reflects thoughtfully on the emotions in commercial
and corporate contexts. See, e.g. , Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness
and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735 (2001); Peter H.
Huang, Reasons within Passions: Emotions and Intentions in Property Rights Bargaining, 79
OR. L. REV. 435 (2000).
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judge come to represent the universe of potential legal actors. It is dif
ficult, in some ways, to object when the topic is so interestingly and
provocatively covered. Between Pillsbury's exploration of varied and
sometimes atypical emotions that fuel judicial exceptionalism and
Posner's recasting of judicial empathy, a great deal is said about the
possibilities of emotion in judging that has not been said before. Yet,
in other respects, a focus on judging departs least from the first
generation critiques, in ways that may ultimately reinforce the rea
son/passion dichotomy. If you suspect that emotion may indeed be
atypical in, if not antithetical to, the law, you may be most absorbed
with finding and exploring it within that central bastion of legal ra
tionalism, judicial decisionmaking. If you believe that emotion, as
Bandes boldly declares, pervades the law, the presence of emotion in
judicial decisionmaking becomes less remarkable. It becomes more in
teresting, and imperative, to explore the operation of emotion in other
legal roles, and to contrast this operation with the life of emotion in
the judicial domain. It is relevant not only how emotion fuels the work
or organizes the experience of the great judicial dissenters, but also
how it shapes the efforts of eminent legal strategists, such as, for ex
ample, Charles Hamilton Houston. It becomes fruitful to consider
whether or how emotion shifts or changes when one moves from a
role of advocacy to a role of adjudication, like Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
Thurgood Marshall, or Louis Brandeis. Beginning a second-generation
inquiry into the emotions of a range of legal actors is an effort that
might productively have been commenced in this volume and should
be undertaken in the future.
III.

CONCLUSION: EMOTION AND THE SENSIBILITIES OF LEGAL
SCHOLARS

As The Passions of Law makes clear, the conceptual gains to be
reaped from the study of law and the emotions are larger even than its
early proponents suspected. But to think solely in terms of analytic
progress risks recharacterizing law as a purely rational enterprise. If
learning about law is an enterprise that engages our emotional sensi
bilities, in endlessly varied interaction with our capacity for reason, we
might also ask how this new genre of inquiry affects the emotions of
those who take part in it. It is a question that cannot be answered con
clusively by reflecting on their work product, for scholars with certain
kinds of emotional sensibilities may be more drawn to this field than
to others, and their topics may make them atypically aware of the
emotional states that they are communicating as they write. Yet one of
the most striking features of this collection is a largeness of spirit, a
vivid, non-instrumental interest in the human subjects of its inquiry.
This lively and generous interest manifests itself in many different
ways, but it is strikingly distinct from studied detachment or arch,
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sometimes contemptuous, humor that are too often the emotion va
lences associated with scholarship about the law. Nussbaum's moving
evocation of Whitman's Song of Myself, as a healing answer to the dis
gust rained on gays and lesbians; the generosity of spirit and flashes of
humor with which Miller treats the narratives of . those accused of
"throwing away [their] weapons" (p. 250); the humility and candor
with which Murphy explores the possibility of error in a substantial
portion of his scholarly work; the respectful attention, inflected with
wonder, that Minow brings to the story of Jadranka Cigelj - these are
rare moments in law-related scholarship and great gifts to the readers
of this collection. They invite us to imagine a future in which the study,
and perhaps the operation, of the law might be a more humane expe
rience for all those involved.
A new generation of scholars has ceased the frontal assault on the
dichotomy between law and reason. They have inhabited the aban
doned fortress and are exploring its nooks and crannies, asking how it
can be rebuilt and reintegrated into the landscape it once policed. The
consequences, as The Passions of Law suggests, may transform not
only the legal domain but those who participate in the effort as well.

